knowledge 22 December 2025 |

Clarke v Guardian News and Media: shaping the boundaries of public interest journalism as a matter of English law

A recent High Court judgment in England dealt with several key concepts in English defamation law, including meanings, the burden of proof for the defences of truth and public interest, and the “serious harm” threshold. The judgment shows that claimants in England should be wary of making claims where a publisher may have strong evidence of rigorous investigation.

This decision is relevant to publishers in Ireland in light of the proposed amendments to the defence of fair and reasonable publication on a matter of public interest in the Defamation (Amendment) Bill 2024 (the “Bill”).

Background

On 22 August 2025, the English High Court dismissed a libel claim taken by British actor and director, Noel Clarke, in Clarke v Guardian News and Media Ltd¹. The defendant newspaper had published eight articles between April 2021 and March 2022 which referred to allegations against Mr Clarke by his co-workers (the “Articles”). Each of the Articles was published in hard copy, online and on the app, save for two of the articles which were published only online. There was a preliminary hearing on 1 November 2023 to determine the meanings of the Articles, following which Johnson J made an order determining the natural and ordinary meanings of the Articles.  

In respect of both the defences of truth and of public interest, the parties focused on the first article. It was commonly agreed that the meanings of the second to eighth articles did not go beyond the meaning of the first article, save for a discrete allegation raised by a portion of the fourth article.

The Decision

At trial, the principal issues for determination by the English High Court were whether the defendant had established the statutory defences of truth and of publication on a matter of public interest. While the defendant relied on both defences, establishing either was a complete answer to the claim. The Court further had to consider whether Mr Clarke met the threshold of “serious harm”, as understood under section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013 (the “2013 Act”) under English law.    

The Court held that while the defendant admitted that the first published article had or is likely to cause serious harm to Mr Clarke’s reputation, Mr Clarke had “not properly pleaded the facts and matters on which he relies” to satisfy the statutory threshold for most of the Articles. As a result, a claim in relation to only the first article stood.

The Public Interest Defence

The Court considered whether the public interest defence had been established. The public interest defence in England is contained under section 4 of the 2013 Act. Steyn J summarised the applicable law into three questions to be determined: (i) was the statement complained of on a matter of public interest, or did it form part of such a statement? (ii) if so, did the defendant believe that publishing the statement complained of was in the public interest? and (iii) if so, was that belief reasonable?

With regard to the first question, the defendant claimed that their publication of the Articles, including the first one, was formed as part of a statement on public interest concerning (i) the alleged use by a successful male figure of his power to subject women in his industry to abuse, (ii) BAFTA’s decision to present Mr Clarke with the Outstanding Contribution to Cinema award, and (iii) the alleged failure of the industry to prevent such conduct and to protect women who may be subjected to it. After hearing testimony from the Editor-in-Chief, Ms Viner, Steyn J determined that the first article was in fact on the matters of public interest identified by the defendant.

Considering the first question being answered affirmatively and in seeking to answer the second question of whether the defendant believed that publishing the article was on a matter of public interest, Steyn J referred again to the evidence given by Ms Viner. Steyn J only considered Ms Viner’s evidence for this matter on the basis that she was the sole decision-maker in determining whether the publication of the article was in the interest of the public. Steyn J held that Ms Viner’s evidence was unchallenged and credible.

In a final reckoning of the public interest defence, Steyn J determined whether Ms Viner’s belief (that the publication was in the interest of the public) was a reasonable one. Mr Clarke set forth five areas of challenge in relation to this: “the Hostility Issue”, “the Verification Issue”, “the Contamination Issue”, “the Reply Issue” and “the Deletion Issue”. In determining each of these issues, Steyn J held that they were not so substantial to amount to a demonstration that Ms Viner’s belief in publishing the allegations was objectively unreasonable. Consequently, Steyn J held that the public interest defence had undoubtedly been established.

The ruling provides a roadmap to media companies in England for investigative journalism. In Ireland, the equivalent defence under section 26 of the 2009 Act is narrower, focusing on, inter alia, whether the publication was “fair and reasonable” in all circumstances. The Bill proposes to replace that section with a new “publication on a matter of public interest” defence, bringing it closer into line with the English position. The proposed retention of the “good faith” element of the defence means Irish law will likely remain somewhat more claimant friendly.

That said, Clarke v Guardian News and Media Ltd, while an English judgment, may be instructive of the steps which Irish media outlets can take to bolster the public interest defence under the Bill. In this case, the defendant took a cautious and measured approach from investigation through to publication which included:

• initial meetings to discuss the public interest which were attended by several senior personnel - including the Editor in Chief, Deputy Editor, Head of Investigations, Managing Editor, Director of Editorial Legal Services, etc - some of who were the decision-makers with respect to publication;
• speaking to multiple sources, corroborating their accounts and fact-checking line-by-line (including quotes, dates, and ages) right up to publication;
• avoiding any communication between sources until their accounts had been obtained;
• affording the plaintiff adequate time and opportunities to respond to the allegations;
• positioning the plaintiff’s statement for publication near the top of the article and his individual responses parallel with the allegations; and
• excluding matters from publication which were considered properly of the private lives of the plaintiff, his professional associates, and his family.

Conclusion

The English High Court’s ruling in this case highlights the high bar for defamation actionability in England and the requirements to be able to successfully rely on the public interest defence.

It also underscores the protections available to investigative journalism under English law, where rigorous investigation and public interest are demonstrated. The judgment provides guidance for publishers on the evidentiary and procedural steps necessary to defend against defamation claims, and it may serve as a useful reference point in future for Irish publishers and practitioners.