Gatekeeping Justice: What 153 Supreme Court Determinations in 2025 Tell Us About Likely Trends for 2026
Introduction
The establishment of the Court of Appeal through the Thirty-third Amendment to the Irish Constitution in 2014 resulted in a fundamental change to the caseload of the Supreme Court. The constitutional function of the Supreme Court is no longer that of an appeal court designed to correct alleged errors by the trial court; rather the establishment of the Court of Appeal has enabled the Supreme Court to adjudicate on a narrower, targeted set of appeal cases which raise more consequential issues of public importance.
The Supreme Court may hear both tertiary appeals, from decisions of the Court of Appeal, and “leapfrog” appeals, directly from decisions of the High Court and which bypass the Court of Appeal.
An appeal to the Supreme Court whether directly from the High Court (under Article 34.5.4) or from the Court of Appeal (under Article 34.5.3) requires it to be established that:
(a) the decision sought to be appealed against involves a matter of general public importance; or
(b) it is necessary that there be an appeal in the interests of justice.
In determining whether either of the above criteria (warranting leave to appeal) are met, the Supreme Court’s determination in BS v DPP 1 and judgment in Quinn Insurance v PricewaterhouseCoopers 2 continue to be the leading authorities in this regard. In relation to the “general public importance” criterion the Supreme Court has accepted that, firstly, the point needs to be stateable, and, secondly, that it should normally have the capacity to be applicable to cases other than that under consideration. However, the Supreme Court also accepts that it is possible for the subject matter of the case itself to be of public importance. In relation to the criterion that leave should be granted in the interests of justice, the Supreme Court has indicated that this is best viewed as a residual category. While it has provided examples of circumstances where the interests of justice would lie in favour of an appeal to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court has also indicated that the nature of the interests of justice criterion requires it to be sufficiently flexible to respond to the demands of the individual case.
An additional requirement must be present in order to secure leave for a leapfrog appeal - that there are “exceptional circumstances” warranting such an appeal to the Supreme Court.
In its determination in Wansboro v DPP 3 the Supreme Court summarised some of the factors that weigh in favour of allowing a leapfrog appeal, which include, for example, the cost of financing two appeals where the perceived advantages of an intermediate appeal are not particularly strong, and the need for expedition and the fact that proceedings involving two appeals will take longer. In Karshan Midlands t/a Dominos Pizza v Revenue Commissioners,4 the Supreme Court identified a further factor, namely whether the issue for determination creates the inevitability, or strong probability, of the case going further to the Supreme Court despite a judgment by the Court of Appeal. Karshan was cited in 4 separate Supreme Court determinations granting leave for a leapfrog appeal in 2025.
2025 Supreme Court determinations in review, and what we can expect for 2026
2025 marked another active year for Supreme Court determinations on leave to appeal applications, with the Supreme Court making 153 determinations. Analysing these determinations reveals some insights into the current litigation landscape before the Irish Superior Courts and what we can expect for 2026, including that:
(a) 89 of the determinations related to tertiary appeals, while 64 related to leapfrog appeals.
(b) 24 determinations related to criminal law; 85 determinations related to public law disputes involving the State or an emanation of the State as either the applicant or respondent; and 44 determinations related to civil disputes between private parties.
(c) The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in 22 of the 63 leapfrog appeal applications it determined (34.9%)5 and in 21 of the 89 tertiary appeal applications it determined (23.6%). One leapfrog application was adjourned to permit an oral hearing.6
The 153 determinations in 2025 marked a slight decrease from 2024, in which the Supreme Court made 164 determinations, but an increase from 2023, 2022 and 2021, which saw 143, 140 and 133 determinations respectively.
Of the 22 determinations granting leave to appeal in leapfrog appeals in 2025, 4 such determinations, as noted above, cited Karshan as a factor in the assessment of whether exceptional circumstances exist:
(a) Protect East Meath Limited v Meath County Council,7 concerning the circumstances in which the Court should exercise its power to make an order of mandamus where a local authority has failed to carry out a mandatory statutory obligation.
(b) Redwood Extended Care Facility v Tailte Éireann,8 concerning valuation assessments for centres catering for adults with disabilities and which are in receipt of State funds.
(c) O’Donnell v Dublin City Council,9 concerning the statutory obligations on a Chief Executive of a local authority under the Planning and Development Act 2000.
(d) Governor and Company of Bank of Ireland v O’Boyle,10 concerning the enforceability of surcharge interest and the operation of the rule against penalties in relation to the default on a loan by the respondent.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in its consideration of tertiary leave to appeal applications has remained constant. However, in leave for leapfrog appeal applications, the 2025 review of Supreme Court determinations indicates that the Karshan factor of the inevitability, or strong probability, of the case going further to the Supreme Court despite a judgment by the Court of Appeal, has been potentially persuasive in several cases. This highlights the significance of the Karshan factor and its potential to influence litigants’ calculations about the viability of leapfrog appeals in 2026.
Also contributed to by Lara O’Donohue
- [2017] IESCDET 134
- PriceWaterhouseCooper v Quinn Insurance Ltd [2017] 3 IR 812.
- [2017] IESCDET 115.
- [2022] IESCDET 121.
- This figure is skewed upwards due to the leave to appeal applications by the Minister for Foreign Affairs against the judgment of Phelan J in the High Court in X v Minister for Foreign Affairs and Y v Minister for Foreign Affairs [2025] IEHC, which jointly determined five judicial review applications relating to the same subject matter, being adjudicated as five separate determinations by the Supreme Court rather than jointly.
- Friends of Ardee Bog v An Bord Pleanála and Louth County Council [2025] IESCDET 29
- [2025] IESCDET 69
- [2025] IESCDET 90
- [2025] IESCDET 118
- [2025] IESCDET 131
This document has been prepared by McCann FitzGerald LLP for general guidance only and should not be regarded as a substitute for professional advice. Such advice should always be taken before acting on any of the matters discussed.






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